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leveraged buy-outs
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Leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) occur when the
management of a company purchases its shares
from existing shareholders and effectively
becomes the owner. The target is typically a
public company or a subsidiary of one that is
taken private, with a significant portion of the
cash purchase price being financed by debt.
This debt is secured not by the credit status
of the purchaser but by the assets of the target
company. The debt used has usually been high-
yield securities of substandard investment grade
quality, commonly referred to as “junk bonds.”
An important criterion for an LBO is a gap
between the existing market value of the firm
and the value determined by a reappraisal of the
assets or by the capitalization of expected cash
flows. Moreover, after an LBO the incoming
management is often able to achieve dramatic
savings in the business’s operating costs.
LBOs tend to be mature businesses with
a demonstrable record of stable consistent
earnings, a significant market share, and expe-
rienced in place management. Manufacturing
and retailing businesses are attractive because
they also contain a basis for asset secured loans
or stable income streams for unsecured or
subordinated debt. Low capital intensive service
businesses are less popular because of their
narrow asset bases.
LBOs are said to be attractive to all those
involved. Typically, the target concern’s top
management approaches an investment banker
with an LBO proposal. In some cases, specialist
banks may take the initiative. The bankers
then package an LBO deal, usually involving
commercial bankers, insurance and finance
companies, pension funds, and the like. The
final deal will provide the incumbent manage-
ment with the opportunity to purchase a stake
in the common stock that is much greater
than they would be able to obtain on the basis
of their individual resources, provided that
they can successfully secure the debt. Usually,
however, the management group’s resources still
only provide a small percentage of the initial
investment.
This equity gap has led to the creation of a
new form of financing known as mezzanine-
level finance. Such lenders are often limited
partnerships with wealthy investors, venture
capitalists, and pension funds as limited part-
ners, supported by an investment banking
firm acting as a general partner. In addition to
investing in common equity, mezzanine lenders
also hold securities senior to management equity
but subordinate to secured debt. Most mezza-
nine financiers are short- to medium-term
investors who expect to resell their share of the
equity a few years after purchase to realize a
substantial capital gain.
LBOs are far from risk-free. First, an LBO
offer may serve to attract more bidders, although
this is not a problem if the primary objective
is to achieve the best value for existing share-
holders. Second, and more important, is the risk
of insolvency. As revolving bank lending is a
primary means of financing LBOs, they are very
sensitive to increases in interest rates as a result
of their highly leveraged position.
The risk of diversification is also a poten-
tial problem. LBO firms tend to be relatively
undiversified and from mature industries. The
process of diversification, especially from a
single business strategy or a dominant business
strategy, suffers a high failure rate. Further-
more, as LBOs revert to private status, financial
reporting becomes much less transparent than
with publicly owned concerns, increasing the
risk to lenders.
Research on merger and acquisition activity
from 1991 to 2006 has observed how covenant
protection (which limits certain actions a
company may take) affects the probability of
takeovers. In one study of LBOs, the results
showed that bond holders with covenant protec-
tion benefited from an increase in wealth,
while unprotected bonds experienced a higher
decrease once the LBO was announced. The
presence of bond holder change-in-control
covenants reduced the firm’s probability of
being subjected to an LBO. Change-in-control
covenants also decreased the likelihood of
non-LBO takeovers (Billett, Jiang and Lie,
2010).
Recent empirical evidence shows that private
equity firms are also inclined to investment
with less leverage. They are more likely to
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take minority equity shareholding in public
or private companies. Private equity firms are
becoming more involved in minority equity
investments, in the forms of venture capital and
international investments. This is commonplace
in Asia. More corporate investors are offering
additional value without taking full control of
an organization. The relatively new mode of
operation of private equity firms is increasing
the supply for capital for minority investments.
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2010).
See also acquisition strategy; corporate venturing;
joint ventures; mergers and acquisitions; post-
acquisition integration
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